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Abstract 
There is an extensive historical dataset on real GDP per capita prepared by Angus Maddison. This dataset covers 
the period since 1870 with continuous annual estimates in developed countries. All time series for individual 
economies have a clear structural break between 1940 and 1950. The behavior before 1940 and after 1950 can be 
accurately (R
2
 from 0.7 to 0.99) approximated by linear time trends. The corresponding slopes of regressions lines 
before and after the break differ by a factor of 4 (Switzerland) to 19 (Spain). We have extrapolated the early trends 
into the second interval and obtained much lower estimates of real GDP per capita in 2011: from 2.4 (Switzerland) 
to 5.0 (Japan) times smaller than the current levels.  When the current linear trends are extrapolated into the past, 
they intercept the zero line between 1908 (Switzerland) and 1944 (Japan). There is likely an internal conflict 
between the estimating procedures before 1940 and after 1950. A reasonable explanation of the discrepancy is that 
the GDP deflator in developed countries has been highly underestimated since 1950.  In the USA, the GDP deflator 
is underestimated by a factor of 1.4. This is exactly the ratio of the interest rate controlled by the Federal Reserve 
and the rate of inflation. Hence, the Federal Reserve actually retains its interest rate at the level of true price 
inflation when corrected for the bias in the GDP deflator.  
 
Introduction 
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is not a directly measured macroeconomic variable. By 
definition, real GDP is estimated from actually measured nominal GDP (NGDP) which is 
corrected for the change in prices of all goods and services. The latter is defined as the GDP 
deflator, which is estimated and (somewhat subjectively) evaluated according to an extended set 
of complex procedures described in National Income and Product Accounts’ documentation 
(BEA, 2011). Therefore, real GDP is a virtual value which depends on definitions of nominal 
GDP and GDP deflator. As a result, the overall behavior of real GDP should change together 
with the GDP deflator or NGDP. In this paper, we investigate the change in time trend observed 
in real GDP per capita and its consequences for the estimates of price inflation. In developed 
countries, this time trend has a clear break from 1940 to 1950 with the slope jumping by an 
order of magnitude.   
 For the purposes of our study, there are two important problems of the evolution of real 
GDP per capita in developed countries. The first problem is whether the time series are 
stationary since the start of measurements? It was formulated by Nelson and Plosser (1982) and 
has been in the centre of macroeconomic discussion on the permanent effect of shocks to output 
ever since (e.g. Ben-David et al., 2003; Narayan, 2006; Cuestas and Garratt, 2008). Stationarity 
was reported in some studies (e.g. Beechey and Österholm, 2008; Vougas, 2007). This is 
practically equivalent to a constant annual increment (Kitov, 2009; Kitov and Kitov, 2012).   
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In many studies, however, the null of a unit root in the output time series is not rejected 
(e.g. Michelacci and Zaffaroni, 2000; Mayoral, 2006). This is likely the result of structural 
breaks which cannot be ignored in unit root tests and present the second important aspect of our 
study. Chen (2008) used the Lagrange multiplier unit root test with two adopted structural 
breaks and rejected the null of a unit root in 11 from 19 developed countries including Australia, 
Japan, the US, the UK, and Germany.  Caporale and Gil-Alana (2009) found a break in the 
second quarter of 1978 in the quarterly real per capita GDP series for the US and showed that, 
statistically, the best time trend is a linear one. This result supports our analysis of the trends 
and breaks in real per capita GDP time series (Kitov and Kitov, 2012).  
In Section 1, we consider a model based on Maddison (2004) historical dataset with a 
(piece-wise) constant annual increment of real per capita GDP (mean-reverting around a linear 
deterministic trend) and a structural break. The break is artificial and likely associated with the 
change in measuring units/procedures. Linear regressions are calculated in both segments and 
extrapolated into the counterparts. In Section 2, by extrapolating the earlier trend into the 
second half of the1900s we re-estimate the real per capita GDP and thus the GDP deflator since 
1950. For the US, the updated inflation series is compared to the interest rate defined by the 
Federal Reserve. 
  
1. Model and Maddison dataset 
Under our empirical framework (Kitov, 2009), real GDP per capita, Gt, in developed countries 
grows as a linear function of time (we call it inertial growth):  
 
Gt = At + C                (1)  
 
Relationship (1) defines a linear trajectory of GDP per capita, where C=Gt0 and t0 is the starting 
time. In the regime of inertial growth, the real GDP per capita increases by a constant value A 
per time unit. The relative rate of growth along the inertial linear growth trend, gt, is the 
reciprocal function of G: 
 
gt = A/Gt                                    (2)  
Relationship (2) implies that the rate of GDP growth will be asymptotically approaching zero 
(diminishing returns), but the annual increment A will always be constant. This is different from 
the Solow-type model where the rate of growth is a positive (nonzero) value. In our model, the 
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absolute rate of GDP growth is constant and is equal to A [$/y]. This constant annual increment 
thus defines the constant “speed” of economic growth in a one-to-one analogy with Newton’s 
first law. Hence, one can consider the property of constant speed of real economic growth as 
“inertia of economic growth” or simply “inertia”.  
In Figure 1, we present real GDP per capita in fourteen biggest developed economies as 
a function of time. One can see two distinct periods of linear growth: before 1940 and after 
1950. There is a ten-year period of very high turbulence induced by the Second World War. In 
essence, the global economy did not perform according to purely economic laws during this 
period. In addition, the concept of Gross Domestic Product was introduced and implemented 
during this short period. The measured GDP time series in developed countries are all started in 
1950. The GDP values are reconstructed before 1950 from incomplete data. One might consider 
the period between 1940 and 1950 as a transition to new units and procedures of GDP 
measurements. In any case, there is a clear break in all time series somewhere between 1940 
and 1950. Without loss of accuracy we exclude this period from our analysis.  
 
Figure 1. The evolution of real GDP per capita (Maddison data set) from 1870 to 2008. The left 
panel presents all time series in the lin-lin scale and the right panel in the lin-log scale. Except the 
US and Canada, no country reveals exponential growth. There are rather two segments with 
sustainable linear trends and a break between 1940 and 1950.  
 
We have calculated linear regressions for all time series in both segments. Table 1 lists 
both estimated slopes in all countries and their ratio. Notice that we have replaced Maddison 
dataset with the Total Economy Database (TED) after 1950 (Conference Board, 2012). They are 
practically identical before 2008 and the TED includes estimates through 2011. (Only Japan and 
Spain show significant discrepancy between TED and Maddison estimates during the most 
recent period. For Japan, the TED and historical curve started to deviate in 1993.)  The largest 
ration belongs to Spain (19.2) and the lowermost to Switzerland (4.0). This is a dramatic break 
in the relevant linear time trends. For the US, the ratio is 6.4. The split into two time segments 
is an alternative to exponential growth. Only the US and Canada demonstrate (likely by 
construction) a quasi-straight line in the lin-log coordinates, as shown in the right panel of 
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Figure 1. Since other countries are far from an exponential path during the whole period we 
prefer to divide it into two linear segments.  This hypothesis is likely a superior one considering 
the differences in time series before and after the break.  
We have already shown (Kitov and Kitov, 2012) that the first differences of real per 
capita GDP in these countries have no statistically significant trends before 1940 and after 1950. 
This is equivalent to linear time trends in the GDP series, as predicted by (1). In addition, 
Tables 2ab demonstrate that the first differences are stationary in both periods. (Kitov and Kitov 
(2012) showed that the fluctuations before 1940 are not normally distributed.) The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the DF-GLS tests with 4 time lags reject the null of unit roots in 
almost all cases except Spain and, in part, Japan. As mentioned above, these two countries have 
a degree of uncertainty in the GDP estimates and also had extended periods of severe political, 
social and economic turbulence in the past, and thus, might diverge from true economic growth. 
In the US GDP series between 1869 and 2001, Mayoral (2006) found nonstationarity (order of 
integration from 0.5 to 1.0), but she did not include a structural break.  In any case, the length of 
the involved time series allows appropriate statistical power for all statistical tests. All in all, the 
annual increments are stationary and have no significant trends in both periods. It is possible to 
consider both periods separately and to extrapolate corresponding trends into their counterparts. 
 
Table 1. Slopes of the real GDP per capita curves between 1950 and 2011 (TED) and from 1870    
and 1940 (Maddison).  
Country Slope, 
TED 
Slope, 
Maddison 
Ratio 
Australia 310.2 25.66 12.1 
Austria 349.9 21.44 16.3 
Belgium 321.3 32.26 10.0 
Canada 314.0 48.82 6.4 
France 298.1 38.19 7.8 
Germany 339.9 36.26 9.4 
Italy 348.2 24.64 14.1 
Japan 286.2 30.45 9.4 
Netherlands 319.5 38.90 8.2 
Spain 277.3 14.46 19.2 
Sweden 299.0 52.88 5.7 
Switzerland 247.2 61.41 4.0 
UK 282.7 39.44 7.2 
US 387.7 60.86 6.4 
 
In Figure 2, we extrapolate the TED time series back to 1870 and the Maddison 
historical estimates are extrapolated through 2011.  All estimates are in 1990 International 
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Geary-Khamis dollars. As expected, the time series before 1940 and after 1950 are both well 
approximated by linear time trends. Interestingly, the extrapolated TED curves for Japan and 
Spain intersect the zero line in 1944 and 1943, respectively. For Switzerland, the extrapolated 
curve intersects the x-axis in 1908. For other countries, the intercept years vary between 1920 
and 1940.  This observation shows that a structural break in needed to avoid a negative GDP per 
capita before 1940. Such a structural break is likely of artificial nature and the historical 
estimates before 1940 might express the true (real) economic growth.  
 
Table 2a. Unit root tests in the first difference between 1870 and 1940. 
Country  ADF DF-GLS (lags) 
  4 3 2 1 
Austria  -5.27 -3.056 -2.928 -3.637 -4.837 
Belgium  -7.07 -3.619 -3.230 -3.746 -5.641 
France -8.13 -3.225 -3.432 -4.494 -6.135 
Germany -7.04 -2.831 -3.060 -3.807 -5.172 
Italy  -7.23 -4.420 -5.007 -5.286 -4.928 
Netherlands  -7.62 -3.125 -3.197 -3.259 -4.028 
Spain -7.35 -1.338 -3.174 -3.530 -4.298 
Sweden  -7.25 -3.060 -2.726 -3.489 -4.932 
Switzerland  -6.87 -2.878 -3.168 -4.187 -5.399 
UK -5.90 -2.341 * -3.399 -3.652 -3.737 
US -7.30 -4.457 -4.488 -4.446 -5.493 
Japan -8.52 -1.038 * -2.072 * -3.220 -5.868 
Australia -8.35 -3.839 -3.736 -3.710 -4.063 
Canada -5.53 -3.653 -4.307 -4.253 -4.465 
  *null rejected 
 
Table 2b. Unit root tests in the first difference between 1950 and 2008. 
Country  ADF DF-GLS (lags) 
  4 3 2 1 
Austria  -5.999 -3.988 -3.862 -3.506 -4.676 
Belgium  -6.819 -3.209 -3.100 -3.672 -4.002 
France -5.36 -2.916 -3.508 -3.363 -4.170 
Germany -7.894 -1.725 -2.186 -2.382 -4.065 
Italy  -5.856 -2.669 -3.855 -3.978 -4.988 
Netherlands  -4.605 -2.463 -3.302 -3.542 -3.605 
Spain -3.136 -1.724 * -2.049 * -2.234 * -2.413 * 
Sweden  -3.787 -2.394 * -2.948 -3.105 -3.821 
Switzerland  -5.455 -3.985 -3.684 -4.276 -5.407 
UK -4.688 -1.633 * -2.111 *  -2.566 * -3.453 
US -5.811 -3.046 -3.689 -4.436 -4.928 
Japan -4.529 -1.965 * -2.393 * -2.226 * -3.571 
Australia -5.417 -1.616 * -2.527 * -2.811 -4.559 
Canada -5.351 -2.660 * -3.317 -3.705 -4.132 
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There are important implications of the constant annual increment (diminishing returns) 
for economic policy in developed countries. Economists and economic authorities (e.g. the FRB 
and CBO) are waiting for a significant increase in the rate of real economic growth to close so 
called output gap, i.e. the difference between the measured level of real GDP and that expected 
form exponential extrapolation of the trend observed before 2007. In reality, there is no output 
gap, as Figure 2 demonstrates. Only Italy and Japan are far below the linear trend in real GDP 
per capita, and Australia is slightly above the expected level. France is also slightly below its 
long term linear trend. These countries might expect a mid-term recovery to the trend in the 
long run. For Australia, we expect a negative correction in the near future. The experience of 
Japan and Ireland clearly indicates that no positive deviation from the linear trend lasts long 
(Kitov, 2009).  
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Figure 2. Real GDP per capita in developed countries from 1870 to 1940 (Maddison historical data) 
and from 1950 and 2011 (TED). Regression lines are extrapolated into the future and past, 
respectively.  
 
The US and UK have been returning to their linear trends during the recent crisis, and 
thus, both should not wait for any elevated rate of real economic growth. The expectation of a 
growth rate of 3.5% per year (in terms of real GDP per capita) after 2014 which has been 
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explicitly articulated by the Congressional Budget Office (2012) in its economic outlook is a 
naïve extrapolation of exponential growth as related to the exponential population growth. The 
US economy will be rising at a pace dictated by the linear trend.  
Table 3.  Real GDP estimates for 2011 from the TED and those extrapolated from the Maddison 
historical estimates using the relevant trends from 1870 to 1940.  
Country TED, $ 
Maddison 
 Extrapolated, $ 
Ratio 
Australia 25,907 7,295 3.55 
Austria 24,702 5,041 4.90 
Belgium 23,999 7,240 3.31 
Canada 25,297 8,421 3.00 
France 21,792 7,093 3.07 
Italy 18,293 5,451 3.36 
Japan 20,054 3,990 5.03 
Netherlands 24,712 8,004 3.09 
Spain 16,874 3,450 4.89 
Sweden 26,104 8,310 3.14 
Switzerland 25,640 10,524 2.44 
UK 22,377 8,699 2.57 
US 30,928 10,956 2.82 
 
Table 3 lists the current (2011) estimates of real per capita GDP and those obtained by 
extrapolation of the trends before 1940. The current level is 2.44 (Switzerland) to 5.03 (Japan) 
higher than the extrapolated one.   Therefore, one may consider the current levels as 
overestimated ones. Then, the relevant GDP deflators have been systematically underestimated 
since 1950. 
 
2. Real GDP, price inflation, and the federal funds rate 
Having a new estimate of real GDP per capita in the US one may raise doubts about the 
accuracy of price inflation estimates. Real GDP is not measured directly but instead defined as 
the difference between the directly measured nominal GDP and the evaluated GDP deflator. 
With all measurement problems related to the nominal GDP, this macroeconomic variable is 
estimated using actual prices. It is likely that some products and services are not counted in 
(black or grey markets) or double counted. However, the portion of these products and service 
in the nominal GDP is rather small and likely not changing over time. Therefore, one always 
has a larger and constant portion of the true nominal GDP which accurately describes the 
overall evolution of the US economy.  
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 The rate of inflation tells a different story. The diversity of good and services changes at 
a pace not allowing to directly compare and estimate their relative prices. There are numerous 
procedures to evaluate qualitatively and then quantitatively the change in consumer prices of 
practically incomparable goods and services (e.g. film and digital photography) as well as to 
extrapolate  real prices of new products into the past (e.g. computers or mobile phones).  With 
all this turbulent world of prices, the Bureau of Economic Analysis has managed to provide the 
estimates of GDP deflator at a regular (quarterly and annual) basis.   
In Figure 3, we display several curves normalized to their respective levels in 1950: the 
GDP deflator from 1950 to 2011 as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (green line), 
the BEA real GDP per capita since 1929 (red line), and the Maddison historical curve from 
1870 to 2008 (blue line). Notice that the BEA and Maddison real GDP curves diverge before 
and coincide after 1950.  In order to match the level of 1.0 in 1950, we shifted the Maddison 
curve between 1870 and 1940 upwards by 0.242 (dashed line). The trend in the shifted 
Maddison curve is extended through 2011. Then the level of real GDP per capita in 2011 would 
have been $10,956 instead of $30,928, as estimated by the BEA. This means that the GDP 
deflator in 2011 was underestimated by a factor of 2.82.    
Let’s suppose that the real per capita GDP has been evolving along the old trend after 
1950. The reported increase in the level of the GDP deflator, dGDP, since 1950 was 
dGDP2011/dGDP1950=7.73.  Then we expect that the actual price increase (i.e. reported plus 
underestimated) was underestimated by (7.73+2.82)/7.73≈1.37 times or by 37%. In other words, 
the actual rate of price inflation is 37% higher than that reported by the BEA. 
This is an interesting and instructive value. It is almost exactly equal to the factor by 
which the federal funds rate, R, exceeds the rate of price inflation as defined by the consumer 
price index, CPI. (We do not distinguish here the dGDP and CPI.) The interest rate is defined 
by the Federal Reserve as a major instrument to control price inflation. Figure 4 depicts the 
headline CPI, the CPI multiplied by a factor of 1.4, and effective rate R. The peak values of the 
scaled CPI and R almost coincide in 1980. Figure 5 displays the corresponding cumulative 
curves. In the long run, the scaled CPI and R evolve along the same trend and intersect every 
fifteen to twenty years.  
One might assume that the main intention of the FRB is to keep R above the rate 
consumer price inflation and the higher funds rate should suppress price inflation due to the 
effect of expensive money. In reality, the FRB has been retaining the interest rate at the long 
term level of price inflation in order to create neutral conditions for money supply. This could 
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be a wiser prerequisite for a central bank.  Actually, the FRB does not need that factor 1.4.  The 
problem is in the wrong estimates of inflation since 1950.  
 
 
Figure 3. Real GDP per capita reported by the BEA from 1929 to 2011 and by Maddison from 
1870 to 2008.  Nominal GDP per capita reported by the BEA. The trend (regression equation in 
shown in the Figure) of the Maddison time series between 1870 and 1940 is extrapolated in the 
future. All curves are normalized to 1950.  Therefore, the Maddison curve between 1870 and 1940 
is shifted up by 0.242 in order to match the normalization constant (1.0) in 1950.  Notice the lin-log 
scale.  
 
 
Figure 4. Monthly estimates of R, CPI (MA(12)), and the CPI multiplied by a factor of 1.4.  
 
 
Figure 5. Cumulative values of the monthly estimates of R, CPI, and the CPI multiplied by a factor 
of 1.4. 
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Conclusion 
We have estimated real GDP per capita in fourteen developed countries and found some new 
arguments in favor a (piece-wise) constant annual increment since 1870.  There is an artificial 
structural break in all time series between 1940 and 1950 which might be associated with some 
changes in measuring units/procedures. The latter changes might be expressed in a significant 
underestimation of the economy-wide price inflation since 1950. Instructively, the degree of 
underestimation (~37%) is almost exactly equal to the factor by which the federal interest rate 
exceeds the estimated rate of inflation in the long run. One might assume that the federal rate is 
actually neutral relative to the actual rate of inflation. Currently, the interest rate is very low 
because it has to compensate for the large deviation cumulated between 1990 and 2003. The 
equilibrium (the intercept of the cumulative curves) will be reached in 2013-2015.  
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